Last night, CBC’s The Hour had an interview about Bill C-10 with the porker homophobe Charles McVety, the president of the Canada Family Action Coalition. Bill C-10 is a 600+ page document proposing amendments to the Income Tax Act, one of which would allow Canada’s Heritage Minister to revoke tax credits for films or TV shows “thought to be offensive or not in the public interest”. Our wonderful elected representatives seem to not have actually read the document in full before passing it in the House of Commons, and there’s now outrage in Canada’s artistic communities on how these proposed changes will effectively amount to censorship. McVety, reportedly “one of the most powerful leaders of the Christian Right in this country,” appears to have a fair amount of influence in the drafting of this provision in C-10, and the whole of the country should be very worried about this and the rise of the Christian Right in Canada in general. And, judging by his performance last night, this man is actually an idiot and his influence can bring nothing good whatsoever to this country. Watch the interview for yourself to see, and see if you can get anything meaningful from McVety. There are moments when it seems like he’s approaching coherency–on a couple of occasions he appears close to suggesting that the Canadian government shouldn’t offer tax credits to any filmmakers, but he’s not bright enough to even connect those dots–but he’s too dim to follow anything through. All that I got from the interview is that sex makes McVety very uncomfortable, and therefore sex should make all other Canadians feel uncomfortable. I’m certain his wife agrees.

Saddam’s intelligence services were using barrels of oil to pay charities to provide PR for his regime.

The former spokesman of a Detroit-area Islamic charity, who organized U.S. congressional delegations to Iraq, has been indicted for alleged conspiracy to spy for Saddam Hussein’s government.

Muthanna Al-Hanooti, who worked as a top official at Life for Relief and Development — a charity in Southfield, Mich. — allegedly coordinated U.S. congressional delegations to Iraq at the direction of the executed dictator’s intelligence service between 1999 and 2002.

I wanted to do a proper post on all this (analysis) but time available, events, the speed at which they move, and the sheer complexity of shite has worked against that ever happening today (I maybe thick as well). For now — make sense of the following if you care to. Iraq at the moment is a most complex set of circumstances — there is no proving of credentials needed, or likewise the shoving of an ideological ‘cultural code’ to like minded fuckwits; where Iraqi’s themselves are reduced to the level of baby seals and are thus ignored. Iraqis are also active participants — better to take note of that and what their struggles actually are then. if you please.

Some links further, and in addition to this post.

This…

I have failed to liberate Iraq, and transform its society into an Islamic society.” — Moqtada al-Sadr, Asharq Al Awsat newspaper, March 8, 2008

And this…

“The continued presence of the occupiers, on the one hand, and the disobedience of many on the other, pushed me to isolate myself in protest. I gave society a big proportion of my life. Even my body became weaker, I got more sicknesses.”

While also citing…

“the betrayal of some followers, whom he accused of falling prey to “materialistic” politics[.]”… for his stance.

And then this:

Muqtada’s motivations aside, his decision opens the possibility of a more genuine and lasting transformation of the Sadrist movement. In the months following his announcement, he sought to rid it of its most unruly members, rebuild a more disciplined and focused militia and restore his own respectability, while promoting core demands – notably, protecting the nation’s sovereignty by opposing the occupation – through legitimate parliamentary means. The challenge is to seize the current opportunity, seek to transform Muqtada’s tactical adjustment into a longer-term strategic shift and encourage the Sadrists’ evolution toward a strictly non-violent political actor.

However:

The fighting is the most serious sign yet that a cease-fire credited with helping to reduce violence nationwide may be unraveling.

And this:

And this:

And make sure to read the update ya’ll.

We’ll no doubt see very shortly as events unfold…

All of that lot should be read in conjunction with the following article that I got from IraqsloggerDOTcom (see sidebar) which has continual up to date information on Iraq but is frustratingly subscription-based (the bastards — the evil fucking bastards). However, (joy of joys) a copy of the article has been passed onto me by a comrade…remember — knowledge is not a ‘partially exlcudable good’ (or at least it shouldn’t be, for fuck’s sake — have I really got to explain that one to you?)…

For those with a keen interest, the Wiki page for the article’s primary source, ie Al-Akhbar newspaper is here. The paper’s site is here.

Arab Papers Sat: “Republic of Militias”
Newspaper Probes the New Iraqi Political Scene
By AMER MOHSEN 03/21/2008 6:23 PM ET
Al-Akhbar

In one of the best features prepared for the fifth anniversary of the Iraq War, the Lebanese al-Akhbar daily devoted a special supplement this week to Iraqi affairs and to an assessment of Iraq five years after the invasion.

Contrary to the Western media, where much ink is being spilled nowadays discussing the circumstances surrounding the decision to invade Iraq, and who should shoulder the blame for the war’s mistakes, or conversely, what strategies should be adopted to end the Iraq debacle; al-Akhbar did not dwell much on the original event of the invasion or on future policy prescriptions. Instead, the paper’s editor said, the focus was on mapping the new political scene that has emerged five years after the fall of the dictatorship.

On the fifth anniversary of the invasion, the editor wrote, the Iraqi scene has become calmer … the number of casualties is significantly lower, but on the other hand, he said, a new political reality is beginning to solidify: contradictions between Iraqis are becoming wider, the country is divided into-quasi independent fiefdoms … where security is imposed by sectarian or ethnic militias, with the support of the government … and that of the occupation forces. Therefore, the supplement was entitled “the Republic of Militias” (a take on “the Republic of Fear”, by Makiya describing Saddam’s rule) and it probed, in a series of articles, the new political camps and fiefdoms that have emerged in post-Saddam Iraq.

An article was devoted to the Sunni political scene, discussing how, after being labeled as responsible for the Tikriti rule, Sunnis originally faced a policy of exclusion, that has been, now, replaced with a discourse of “reconciliation.” The report was a fascinating examination of the Sunni political parties that emerged as representatives of Iraq’s Sunnis after the invasion, and which have been constantly facing a dilemma: on the one hand, their participation in the US-sponsored political process, and on the other, their links to armed groups and the fact that much of their public supports the insurgency (and all the parties of the Sunni IAF have varying links to the insurgency, the report claimed.)

From that dilemma, emerged the Sunni Sahwa (Awakening,) the report said, which was described as “the event of 2007 among Iraq’s Sunnis”. The Islamic Party, one of the first Sunni factions to enter the political process, and one of the more tolerant of the US role, was undergoing a bloody confrontation with al-Qaida, which assassinated several of the party’s leaders, and accused it of aiding the occupation. According to al-Akhbar, the party exploited the growing hatred towards al-Qaida in Sunni provinces and the party’s influence among certain insurgent groups to design the anti-Qaida tribal militias that soon became the largest Sunni fighting force in Iraq. The report credits the party’s leader, Tariq al-Hashimi, for having an instrumental role in the formation of the “Awakening”, which, ironically, is currently clashing with Hashimi’s party in Anbar.

Another article focused on the Shia scene, still reeling from the fracture of the United Iraqi Alliance, the Shia electoral coalition that won the largest number of seats in the 2005 Parliament. The UIA’s demise is due to two main factors: the withdrawal of the popular Sadrist Current, and the splintering of the Dawa party into several competing wings. According to the report, the looming ‘Shia-Shia civil war’, which reflects an old rivalry between the leaderships of the Sadrs and that of the Hakeems, has dispelled earlier notions of a united Shia sect monopolizing the rule of Iraq.

Other interesting articles included a report on the Kurdish Kingdom in northern Iraq, which is currently ruled by the parties of Mas’ud al-Barzani and Jalal al-Talabani, who have been bound by a fragile alliance since the invasion. The two Kurdish parties have had a history of conflict since Talabani dissented from Barzani’s party in the mid-1960s, up to the Kurdish civil war in the mid-1990s. The two men, the article argued, have been more inclined to divide power among each other, rather than share it.

A report on the Iraqi left discussed the state of secular forces in Iraq: disorganized, fragmented, locked into intercinine conflicts and facing the dominance of sectarian groups that are actively working to impose a religious culture on citizens. The largest leftists force: the Iraqi Communist Party, suffered from major rifts when its leadership supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Most of the leftist forces eventually joined the list of Iyad Allawi during the 2005 elections, making it into an eclectic mix of nationalist, Marxist and liberal figures. But successive divisions within Allawi’s ‘Iraqi List’ have weakened the front, whose parties are likely to choose different allies for the next elections.

Nouri al-Maliki, the Prime Minister of Iraq, appears to be making a calculated gamble to secure the future of Iraq. His decision to disarm and neuter Shia militias in Basra using Iraqi forces alone is, if the plan is carried through completely, the sister to the US troop surge.

When things started to go wrong in Iraq in late 2003-2004, many sagely heads wisely pointed out that the UK forces were doing far better than the US forces because of their past experiences in Northern Ireland. However, the US has since learned counter-insurgency the hard way in Iraq, and it has been clear for some time that the UK’s efforts in Southern Iraq, or more specifically Basra, have not been as successful as was hoped. While the surge further North has largely quelled insurgents, the South has become more lawless.

However, the religious zealots are much weaker than they once were. Many Iraqis no longer see religion as the answer, and the horrors of the past few years may have led many to yearn for security from a strong central government. The operation in Basra may be Iraq’s Altalena moment as al-Maliki, like Ben-Gurion before him, realises that there is no future for armed militias in maintaining the security of a state and determining political facts affecting the future of the state.

Even commentators normally blind to promising developments in Iraq note the signal this Basra surge sends:

So if the al-Maliki government is really having a big push on Basra with 15,000 of its own troops, then that is actually a very positive sign indeed in terms of the government’s subjective assessment of its own stability.

Although Sadr’s men are fighting back in Basra, Sadr’s initial response appears to betray a lack of confidence in his own position. He has threatened a nationwide campaign of civil disobedience. What next harsh language?

Six days ago, Seamus Milne wrote:

only when the occupation forces make an unequivocal commitment to leave will Iraq’s main political and military players be compelled to come to an accommodation.

Milne is correct that Iraq’s political and military players will have to come to some accommodation. The nature of the accommodation in al-Maliki’s eyes is becoming clearer. We can only hope that the Basra surge succeeds.

UPDATE: Michael O’Hanlon, and others, are less convinced.

ignore the stupid fucking Yank adverts at beginning and end.